"It was never really on the table but what Europe did is a great thing. We are not going to be doing the export ban. We are going to be doing what we are supposed to do... We are going to have a lot of oil."
U.S. retail diesel passed $6.50 a gallon in September 2026 as the Iran and Ukraine wars cut exports from Russia, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. On Tuesday, September 22, at the United Nations, standing beside Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, Trump was asked about Republican calls to halt diesel exports and said: "Well, I have called for that, too. I have said, let us not send out the diesel. We make a lot of diesel." He added: "I have called for it. I have called for it within my people. I have been talking about it," and cautioned that a ban could have "a little bit of effect" on gasoline. Bessent said at the same meeting: "We are examining that, whether it is feasible in terms of the overall refining capacity and whether a full or a partial ban would work." The industry response was immediate and is entirely on the record. The American Petroleum Institute issued a statement the same day from chief executive Mike Sommers: "restricting U.S. energy exports would only compound the problem — exacerbating refining challenges and ultimately hurting consumers. The answer is more supply and more flexibility — not new restrictions that risk making a difficult situation worse." Refiner shares fell. On September 25, a letter signed by API, AFPM, IPAA and a long list of manufacturers and chambers urged the President to "reject calls to ban or otherwise limit the exports of diesel," arguing a ban "would force reductions in refining utilization, increase prices for gasoline and jet fuel, and lead to retaliatory actions from other countries," and noting they agreed on this with Energy Secretary Chris Wright and Interior Secretary Doug Burgum. Wright had already told the Daily Caller on September 17 that a ban would mean "more expensive gasoline right away." On Sunday, September 27, at the Presidents Cup, Trump told a Fox News reporter: "We are thinking about it very seriously. That can oftentimes lead to a little bit of an increase on gasoline for cars, so we are looking at it very seriously. We may do it." On Wednesday, September 30, in the Oval Office with Wright present, he said he had not made up his mind and the option remained on the table. On Thursday, October 1, Wright told Fox News: "Europe can help the situation as well, and I am highly confident they will. This is a time for a coordinated release of diesel stores as we go into harvest season and we go into winter heating oil season... I think we have some positive news coming." Reuters reported the same day, citing three people close to the discussions, that the administration had told Germany and France to draw down emergency diesel inventories or face a U.S. export ban; that sourcing is anonymous and is recorded here only as context. On Friday, October 2, G7 leaders met virtually and published a joint statement committing to "a coordinated release through the IEA of 100 million barrels (MB) to begin immediately over 4 months, including a frontloaded substantial diesel release within the first 20 days by G7 members and partners." The same statement commits the members to impose no "export restrictions on energy and energy products" among themselves. Macron, speaking after the meeting, said the release would "bring down the prices of petroleum products, particularly diesel," and gave the line above about the export-ban commitment. Trump posted to Truth Social: "Europe has just agreed to release a massive amount of their heavily stocked Diesel Oil. The process will begin immediately." Later that day, on the South Lawn before departing for a rally in Alabama, he gave the answer above.
Covered it as a win and as a reversal, separately, and never put either one next to the sentence. The G7 release got the headline — 100 million barrels, frontloaded diesel, Macron at the microphone — and the abandonment of the export ban got a paragraph as the thing that made the deal possible. Both are accurate. What nobody reported is that the President described a policy he had personally endorsed, twice, in public, as something that was "never really on the table," on the same day a foreign head of state said on camera that he had been "very clear on this point." That is not a reversal being spun; it is a prior position being deleted. The outlets that ran the "never really on the table" quote did not run the September 22 quote beside it, even though the September 22 quote is the reason the G7 convened. The second thing that went missing is the trade itself. The G7 statement does not merely note that the United States chose not to restrict exports — it binds the members against energy export restrictions among themselves. The instrument the President said he had called for has been given away in writing, in exchange for a four-month drawdown of other countries' reserves, and the written commitment outlives the drawdown. No story asked how long the United States is bound, or what happens in month five. The third is the simplest: everyone who publicly opposed the ban — API, the refiners, the signatories of the September 25 letter, his own Energy Secretary — got the outcome they asked for within ten days, and the President's account is that there was never anything to oppose.
Entry #27, May 27: asked about high gas prices, he said "I don't care about the midterms" and the war came first. Four months later the war is in its eighth month, diesel is above $6.50, Republican candidates are campaigning on an export ban, a Senate super PAC has pulled money out of North Carolina, and the administration's answer to fuel prices is a request that Germany and France open their emergency tanks. That is the same fact pattern with the priorities inverted, and it is on the record in both directions. The structural point is narrower than the politics. For ten days the United States held an announced, presidentially endorsed threat over the diesel export market; the threat moved refiner share prices, generated a coordinated lobbying campaign, and — per anonymous reporting that should be treated as anonymous — was used directly on two allied governments. Then it was traded for a reserve release and written out of existence in the same breath that praised the release. Nothing here is unlawful and nothing here is secret. What the record establishes is that a policy can be announced, priced into markets, used as leverage on allies, surrendered in a multilateral commitment, and then described by the man who announced it as never having existed, inside two weeks, with no outlet placing the first quote next to the last one.